Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the
Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections
Michael D. Green*
My focus in this paper is design defects for prescription drugs
and the treatment of this subject matter in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability (Restatement (Third)), which brings me
to two important qualifications. The action with regard to design
defects in the Restatement (Third) is in section 2(b),' not in the
idiosyncratic design standard for drugs in section 6(c).z More
importantly, for those interested in pharmaceutical liability, the focus
in pharmaceutical products liability is not with section 6(c) and the
t Editor's Note: This Article is based upon a presentation given at Seton Hall
University School of Law's Seventh Annual Health Law Symposium on February 12,
1999.
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Powers for sharing his insights on differences between drugs and durables. This
Article benefited substantially from conversations I had with Professors Gary
Milavetz, Paul Perry, and Robert Wylie of the College of Pharmacy, University of
Iowa, and Mary Teresi, Director, Pediatric Allergy / Pulmonary Clinical Trials,
College of Medicine, University of Iowa. I am grateful for the superb research
assistance provided by Stephanie Nyman and Richard Smith.
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) states:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: .

.

. (b) is

defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIIArY § 2 (1997).
2 Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third)
states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe
the drug or medical device for any class of patients.
Id. § 6(c).
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standard for design defects; rather, the focus should be with section
6(d),' which addresses the informational obligations of drug
manufacturers.
Section 6(d) is critical to pharmaceutical products liability
because prescription drugs, in contrast with medical devices, are
different in one respect from durable goods: the product itself, with
some exceptions, cannot be designed more safely by modifying the
structure of the product. With durable goods - an automobile, for
example - manufacturers almost always can make the product safer
by incurring further costs, either in expending money or diminishing
functionality. For example, the manufacturer could add seat belts,
add an interlock so that the car cannot be started unless everyone is
buckled up, add front air bags, add side air bags, and add even more
exotic safety devices, such as anti-collision sensing technology,
currently in use in some commercial airplanes. In contrast, it is
usually not possible for a manufacturer to redesign a drug.5 With

Section 6(d) of the Restatement (Third) provides:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or
warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
warnings.
Id. § 6(d).
4 The Restatement (Third) does not distinguish between drugs and
medical
devices in section 6 for purposes of design defects. There are significant differences
between drugs and medical devices that I am inclined to think argue for different,
rather than equal, treatment. Nevertheless, I leave medical devices and biologics
(vaccines and genetically engineered health treatments) and their treatment for
desin defect purposes for another day.
Some courts have relied on this difference between drugs and durables. See,
e.g., Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R-I. 1988);
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991); see also ERIC W. MARTIN,
HAZARDS OF MEDICATION 24 (2d ed. 1978) ("The major objective of drug research
and development is to create medications with high activity, low toxicity, and
relatively few side effects. But separation of both toxic and side effects from
therapeutic effects within a drug series is never easy and can never be completely
accomplished."). Pratt and Parnon contend that
[a]lthough machines often can be redesigned to eliminate defects
without impairing their operation, redesign of a drug may be
impossible. Side effects are frequently inseparable from the product
itself and the current level of scientific knowledge about drug effects
may not permit tailoring a drug to specific needs or conditions, much
less to specific individuals. One who seeks a particular therapeutic
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drugs, therefore, the liability game is with the warnings candle, not
with design. Nevertheless, in the symposium for which this Article
was prepared, I was asked to address design defect issues concerning
pharmaceuticals, so that is the topic that I address.
My inquiry on the different design standard for drugs contained
in the Restatement (Third) begins with identification of the
proffered reasons that drugs require (or deserve) special treatment.
After commenting briefly on those reasons, I canvass the different
ways in which to conceptualize a design defect in a pharmaceutical.
With that framework in place, I then reexamine the reasons for
differential treatment in light of the Restatement (Third)'s design
defect standard for pharmaceuticals. It is still too early to know how
section 6 of the Restatement (Third) will affect pharmaceutical
product liability litigation, and an assessment of the Restatement
(Third) may change as the drug-designing technology of the industry
continues to improve. The implications of this inquiry are that there
is a limited class of situations for which design modifications of
pharmaceuticals may exist, and which the Restatement (Third)
ignores in its standard for design defects of drugs. Yet there are good
reasons, some explained in the Restatement (Third) and some not,
for providing a quite limited standard for liability for drug design. In
the end, despite the design modification criticism and some
qualifications and quibbles, the Restatement (Third) appears to have
the matter of drug design liability largely correct.
In addition to our inability to manipulate the product to make it
safer, why are drugs different from other goods? Comment k to
section 402A,6 section 6 of the Restatement (Third), and virtually
every court to confront the question of design defects in
pharmaceuticals all agree that drugs are different. These groups are
less than unanimous, however, in explaining why drugs are different
and the implications of those differences for the appropriate liability
rule for drug design.
Courts and commentators have identified the following reasons
drugs are different:

effect often faces a difficult choice: either accept the drug's defects or
forego its benefits.
George C. Pratt & Fred W. Parnon, Diagnosis of a Legal Headache: Liability for
Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 517, 520-21 (1979). But see infra

note 46 and accompanying text.

6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. k (1965).
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1) Drugs are hig hly regulated by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.
2)

Drugs have high social utility. Or, to put the point in
economic terms, drugs provide substantial consumer surplus;
most of us would pay more for drugs than we are charged
because drugs have a value to most consumers well in excess
of their price.

3) Learned intermediaries, physicians, assist their patients in
determining which drugs will be appropriate
individual patients. 9
4)

7

for those

Drugs that are harmful for some patients may be beneficial
for others.1°

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1997); Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products

and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of
Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 753 (1989-90); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A
Reporter's Perspective,48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 473-74 (1996).
8 See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious
Design
Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence
Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76, 83 (1994); Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section
8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It Really What the Doctor Ordered? 82
CORNELL L. REv. 644, 659 (1997).

This claim often contains two components. First, exposing pharmaceuticals to
design defect liability will create undesirable incentives for the development of new
drugs that, the argument goes, are especially beneficial products. See Ausness, supra
note 7, at 764. Second, permitting design defect liability will raise the price of drugs
and thereby reduce their consumption. See id. The latter argument is in conflict
The
with the position that drugs provide considerable consumer surplus.
conventional wisdom is that there is considerable price inelasticity for
pharmaceuticals, especially because the consumption decision is made by physicians
not bearing the cost of the product. SeeJohn A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in
the EthicalPharmaceuticalIndustry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42J. L. & ECON.
89, 91 (1999). The advent of managed care and cost-containment strategies for
health care, including drug treatment, has likely had significant impact on the
degree to which the conventional wisdom is true.
A variant on the social utility claim, applicable in the vaccine context, is that
drugs have public good-like qualities: We all benefit from certain vaccines whether
we are the vaccinee or not. Because this paper is limited to drugs, I put aside the
public-good claim.
9 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1538-39 (1992);
Henderson, Jr., supra note 7, at 473-74. Professor Henderson claims that substantial

tort deference should be given "to a marketplace for prescription drugs that appears
to function almost perfectly." Id. at 481. Considerable evidence contradicts his
assessment of the functioning of the prescription drug market. See, e.g., Rizzo, supra
note 8, at 112-13 (concluding that advertising raises the cost of pharmaceuticals for
consumers and also likely contributes to greater entry barriers to new firms); infra
note 68.
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF ToRTs: PRODUcrs LIABIUTY § 6 cmt. b (1997).
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Another reason drugs are different is that they frequently involve
risks that cannot be identified through reasonable research and
testing. Only after the extensive premarketing approval testing
required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and upon
distribution to the general public do those risks emerge, often after
many years of use by the public." That difference, a significant one,
raises an important issue that I want to identify and then put aside
because the issue is not peculiar to drugs. Although far more
prevalent with drugs than with durable goods, this characteristic
applies to all chemical products that cause insidious disease. The
question is whether risks must be foreseeable before a product
manufacturer has an obligation to2 ameliorate
them. In current New
13

Jersey case law, this is the Beshada issue.

There is a great deal of truth to the idea that drugs cannot be
designed differently in the way durable goods can. There are at least
three exceptions to this truth:
Combination drugs.
Because they contain multiple active
ingredients, combination drugs can be designed differently by
omitting one or more of the components.4 For example, Bendectin
was a combination drug designed for morning sickness that initially
consisted of three different active ingredients: pyridoxine (vitamin B6) hydrochloride, an antinauseant; doxylamine succinate, an
antihistamine that also has antinauseant properties; and dicyclomine
hydrochloride, an antispasmodic. 5 Twenty years after Bendectin was
first marketed, in tests the manufacturer performed because of
amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the
manufacturer and the FDA discovered that the three-ingredient drug
was no more effective in fighting morning sickness than was a two-

11 The difficulty in identifying drugs that cause disease is that the mechanisms of
action can rarely be observed and are often poorly understood, often the time from
exposure to clinical symptoms is decades or more, and other causes of the disease
exist, so that epidemiologic or toxicologic studies are required to determine whether
causation exists. See, e.g., TEXTBOOK OF ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS 2 (D.M. Davies ed.,

3d ed. 1985) (explaining that it was 39 years before aspirin was identified as a cause
of Vtric hemorrhage).
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
See Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-23 & n.17 (Mass.
1998) (overruling earlier case law that imputed knowledge of risks regardless of
whether they could reasonably be known at time of manufacture and sale, and

observing that very fewjurisdictions continue to employ an imputing rule).
:4 See Cupp, Jr., supra note 8, at 94; Ausness, supra note 7, at 728.

5 SeeJoseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 301, 317 (1992).
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ingredient drug that omitted dicyclomine hydrochloride. 6 The FDA
required the manufacturer to remove dicyclomine hydrocholoride,
and the manufacturer sold the drug thereafter with only two active
ingredients.
A variation on the combination drug exception relates to the
inert ingredients used to coat, bind, or deliver the active ingredients
to the patient. 7 That inert ingredient can be changed and, at least
on occasion, may pose real risks. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act was reconceived to protect against unsafe drugs in the
wake of a 1938 tragedy that caused the deaths of over 100 children
because a drug manufacturer employed diethylene glycol
(antifreeze)8 as a solvent to prepare a liquid form of a popular
antibiotic.

Dosage. In a second exception to the idea that drugs cannot be
designed differently, manufacturers might modify a drug by lowering
its dose so that the same therapeutic benefits are provided, but the
adverse effects are eliminated or ameliorated with the lower dose. 19
This merely reflects the toxicological dictum, now some four
centuries old, that "the dose makes the poison. 20 In many cases, the
physician must adapt the dose for a patient on an individual basis.
16 SeeJOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 1,

4 & n.9 (1998). Another example is fiorinal, a prescription drug for headaches,
which originally contained a barbiturate, aspirin, caffeine, and phenacetin, an
analgesic. In 1981, phenacetin was removed from the market because of safety
concerns, and fiorinal was redesigned without the phenacetin component. See FOOD
& DRUG LETTER, May 22, 1981, at 3.

Combination drugs are generally disfavored by independent pharmacologists.
See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 26 ("Fixed combinations of some drugs, one or more of
which cause problems such as hypersensitization or rapid development of resistant
organisms, have been prepared. Thus, not only is flexibility of dosage lost, but also

the efficacy of a good drug that may be present.").
17 See TEXTBOOK OFADVERSEDRUGREACTIONS,

supra note 11, at 25 (identifying, as

potential sources of adverse effects, "the additives, solubilizers, stabilizers, colorizers,
and excipients commonly incorporated in pharmaceutical preparations.").
18 See CHARLES 0. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL
152-61
(1970); MARTIN, supra note 5, at 26.
19 See, e.g., Improved Safety with Low-Estrogen Oral Contraceptives,FDA

MED.

BULL. 11

(May 1994) (low-dose oral contraceptive users found at lower risk of
thromboembolism than higher-dose oral contraceptive users); Brochu v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1981) (design defect claim against oral
contraceptive manufacturer alleging excessive dosage of estrogen and concomitant
higher risk of stroke); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HALCiON: AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
OF
SAFETY
AND
EFFICACY
DATA
(1997)
(visited
Nov.
8,

1999)<http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/halcion/>.
20 Paracelsus provided this dictum in the sixteenth century. For a modern
version of this tenet, see Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Role of Toxicology in Causation: A
Scientific Perspective; 1 CTs. HEALTH Sea. & L. 374, 378 (1991).
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But manufacturers provide recommended doses and, in some
instances (oral contraceptives being a notable example), effectively
determine the dose that each patient receives.
Drug Engineering. The final exception to the rule that
manufacturers can redesign drugs is generally more theoretical than
contemporaneously real, although sufficiently attainable that
attention is justified.
Already, rational drug design permits
pharmaceutical researchers to identify a limited number of chemical
compounds that are most likely to have the desired physiological
effects, and thereby limit testing to those select compounds rather
than conduct initial screening on tens of thousands of different
compounds.'
With the tools of microbiology and biotechnology,
manufacturers may engineer drugs so as consciously to modify their
molecular structure to weed out adverse effects while retaining
therapeutic benefits. As technology continues its inexorable march,
this exception will become more significant.
There is even more truth to the proposition that prescription
drugs are heavily regulated. Indeed, a persuasive case can be made
that drugs are the most heavily regulated industry in the United
States.2 That is not to say that the FDA never errs by approving a
drug that should not be on the market.23 Nor is it to say that the FDA
does not delay approval of drugs for longer than is optimal - a
matter of serious health concern, if not of tort law concern.2

It is to

say that the FDA probably does as good a job as any human
institution can do, given its resources, in balancing protection of the
populace with making new beneficial therapies available to the public
in the new drug approval process. 5 If government oversight of drug
1

See Combinational Chemistry Hits the Drug Market, 272 Sca. 1266, 1266-68 (1996)

(describing combinational chemistry methods that permit researchers to synthesize
compounds with slightly altered molecular structures to target specific physiological
actions); see also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
The former director of the Food and Drug Administration's Bureau of Drugs
observed that pharmaceuticals "are today the most heavily regulated consumer
products in our society." J. Richard Crout, The Drug Regulatory System: Reflections and
Predictions, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 106, 113 (1981); see also Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1991) ("No other class of products is subject to such

special restrictions or protections in our society.").
23
24

See infra note 74.
See Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDA's Drug Approval Process, I J. REG. &

Soc. CosTs 35, 35 (1990).
25 See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort
Liability: Examining the

Strongest Cas 30 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 461, 477 (1997) (hereinafter Green, Statutory
Compliance]; see also Henderson,Jr., supranote 7, at 492 (stating that the Restatement
(Third) "reflects the view that courts are institutionally unequipped to substitute

their approval of a proposed new drug, on a case-by-case basis, for that of the FDA").
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safety, ex ante, is as substantial
as it is, why do we need tort law, ex
26
deterrence?
provide
to
post,
The truth value of the third supposed difference has a
significant drop-off from the first two differences.
There are
breakthrough drugs that promise enormous social benefit, and these
are, no doubt, the drugs that are called to mind when this difference
is cited. But, as many have cautioned, most drugs are not the socialutility equivalent of a cure for AIDS.2 7 Indeed, the vast majority of

new drugs provide little therapeutic advantage. Many new drugs are
"me-too" drugs brought to market in the hope that their
manufacturer will be able to obtain some market share for a disease
or condition that is prevalent. Likewise, these drugs may provide
modest or trivial therapeutic advantages.8 Rogaine may be near and
dear to the hearts of some, but it is not the social-welfare equivalent
of antibiotics.
The learned intermediary, which might be idealized as the
physician with perfect information about the available drug therapy
(its characteristics, risks, and benefits) and her patient's condition,
personal characteristics, and medical history, supports the theory that
we do not have to worry about pharmaceutical market failure because
of a lack of information or rational consumer behavior.2
The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) competence in protecting safety in the
new drug-approval process must be distinguished from its oversight of safety in the
postmarketing phase. Resource and structural impediments impede the FDA in this
sphere. See THOMASJ. MOORE, PRESCRIPTION

FOR DISASTER:

THE HIDDEN DANGERS IN

111-12, 115-17 (1998). And the postmarketing period is
crucial in minimizing the risks of prescription drugs. See Green, Statutory Compliance,
supra, at 496-500; Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration
and ProductsLiability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 228 (1987).
26 Of course, one might argue that
tort law furthers goals other than deterrence
and should be retained for one or more of those reasons. See Robert Rabin,
ReassessingRegulatory Compliance,88 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
27 See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND
INNOVATION 20-22 (1976)
(noting that most drugs are unimportant because they represent little or modest
improvement over existing drugs); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA
REVIEW AND APPROVAL TIMES: STATEMENT OF MARY R_ HAMILTON 4 (reporting that
83% of new drug applications (NDA) "were for drugs that FDA considered to offer
YOUR MEDICINE CABINET

little therapeutic benefit beyond that already available to patients").
28

See, e.g.,

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

FDA

DRUG APPROVAL:

5 (1995) (less than 20% of new drug
approvals are for priority drugs); MARTIN, supra note 5, at 27-28 ("Drugs essentially
no more effective than those already available have been developed merely to
compete in the market, perhaps a necessary goal in a highly competitive society.").
But see GRABOWSKI, supra note 27, at 6-7 (claiming that the market disciplines
manufacturers; drugs that do not offer an advantage over existing drugs are
unprofitable).
REVIEW TIME HAS DECREASED IN REENT YEARS

See generally Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50
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The final difference claimed between drugs and durables is that
some drugs that are unreasonably dangerous to some consumers may
be beneficial to another class of consumers. But, at one level, this
claim is unpersuasive. Professor Cupp has adverted to a hypothetical
car in which the manufacturer decided to omit standard safety
devices to better serve consumers desiring an economy vehicle: "In a
nondrug context such as this automobile hypothetical, no court
would preclude design liability solely because there exists a class of
consumers who benefit from the dangerous design. ' 30 Even if the
analogy is improved by considering trade-offs in functionality or
effectiveness with safety (which is the case with drugs), rather than
dollars and safety (which is the case with Professor Cupp's
hypothetical), one can imagine a forklift with a roll-over protective
device that simply could not be used on a ship with low ceilings, or a
childproof cap for drugs that is also elderly-proof, or a redesigned Bic
lighter for a childless couple with arthritis. Still, as Professor Cupp
noted, no court would automatically rule out liability for a redesigned
version of these products to meet the needs of these groups merely
because a minority of consumers are made better off by the design.
STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998).

Cupp,Jr., supra note 8, at 99.
51 At least one case suggests that the statement in the text may be a bit cavalier.

In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., the plaintiff claimed a design defect in a
Volkswagen microbus after the vehicle crashed into a telephone pole. See 489 F.2d
1066, 1068 (4th Cir. 1974). The trial court ruled for the plaintiff based on the
plaintiff's comparison of the crashworthiness of the microbus with a standard
passenger automobile. See id. at 1069. The court of appeals reversed and stated:
The defendant's vehicle, described as 'a van type multipurpose
vehicle,' was of a special type and particular design. This design was
uniquely developed in order to provide the owner with the maximum
amount of either cargo or passenger space in a vehicle inexpensively
priced and of such dimensions as to make possible easy
maneuverability. To achieve this, it advanced the driver's seat forward,
bringing such seat in close proximity to the front of the vehicle,
thereby adding to the cargo or passenger space. This, of course,
reduced considerably the space between the exact front of the vehicle
and the driver's compartment. All of this was readily discernible to any
one using the vehicle; in fact, it was, as we have said, the unique feature
of the vehicle. The usefulness of the design is vouchsafed by the
popularity of the type. It was of special utility as a van for the
transportation of light cargo, as a family camper, as a station wagon
and for use by passenger groups too large for the average passenger
car. It was a design that had been adopted by other manufacturers,
including American. It was a design duplicated in the construction of
the large trucking tractors, where there was the same purpose of
extending the cargo space without unduly lengthening the tractortrailer coupling. There was no evidence in the record that there was
any practical way of improving the 'crashability' of the vehicle that
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Yet there may be more to this distinction than Professor Cupp
and others recognize. Third-party effects are at least part of the
reason for refusing to permit a car to be manufactured without
standard safety features. 32 By this, I mean the risks that are posed to
others

-

passengers, drivers of other automobiles, pedestrians

-

by

the automobile purchaser's decision to buy a car without standard
safety features. Similarly, the concern with an inadequately guarded
industrial machine is not that the employer-purchaser will mangle
her hand in the nip point, but that a worker who had no input in the
decision to buy a more functional, but less safe, machine will be
exposed to the risks it poses, or that a Bic lighter may be found by the
visiting godchild of the childless couple, or that a grandchild may
discover the vial of sedatives in her grandparents' medicine cabinet.
To the extent that one is willing to leave decisions about safety to a
marketplace with reasonably good information, as long as there are
no third-party effects, drugs largely fit this profile, at least in theory.
Only in the rarest situation is there any potential for third-party
effects from drugs.
This recognition of the absence of third-party effects goes handin-hand with another difference between drugs and durables that
supports the position of the Reporters of the Restatement (Third)
and others who assert this "different benefit/risk ratio for different
classes of consumers" argument. The Reporters conceive of a design
defect claim as one in which the plaintiff claims that another drug
constitutes a reasonable alternative design that has less risk than the
original, thereby rendering the original drug defective under the
design defect standard contained in section 2(b). Their view is that
physicians, who have complete (or nearly so) information about the
benefits and risks for different drugs, can assure that the appropriate
drugs reach the appropriate patients, thereby averting any market
failure due to inadequacy of information or even ill-conceived
choices. The real distinction on which the supposed different-

would have been consistent with the peculiar purposes of its design.

Id. at 1073-74 (footnotes omitted).
This case suggests that the question of whether a design for a limited market can be
judged by comparison with alternative designs that would only meet the needs of a
broader market cannot be answered categorically. Notably, the plaintiff was an
injured passenger, not the purchaser of the vehicle. See id. at 1068.
32 I should qualify this claim by recognizing that a
strong strain of paternalism
runs through products liability law. This view protects each of us from our
cognitively imperfect, information-deprived selves. To the extent that this protective
function is emphasized, drugs are no different from lawn darts for purposes of
having tort law provide minimum levels of safety, regardless of consumer preference.
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benefits difference rests is the existence of physicians exercising
informed decisions about drug choice and the relative absence of
third-party effects - not that drugs are different because they offer
differential benefits and risks to different classes of patients.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, identifying the legal
standard for defectively designed drugs is essential. This is a critical
inquiry, the single most ignored issue in the area of pharmaceutical
liability. There has been much ado about whether comment k
abolishes negligent design defect liability as well as strict liability
design claims."3 But the real question is: What do we mean by a
design defect of a drug, whether based on strict liability or
negligence?
There are several possible answers. The first is the one that
Prosser, no doubt, had in mind when drafting comment k.34 Recall
that the standard for defectiveness in section 402A was consumer
expectations, 35 and for many years, the courts adopted that standard
as the measure of defectiveness.36 So, what about a drug that is
defective because it is dangerous beyond consumer expectations?
The issue must first be modified because of our learned
intermediary. The law decrees that drug manufacturers satisfy their
information obligation by providing information to the physician, as
agent for the consuming patient. Thus, we should edit our inquiry
to: "What about a drug that is defective because it is dangerous
Note that the
beyond prescribing physician expectations?, 37
ss See, e.g., Cupp, Jr., supra note 8, at 88.
s4 Since first writing this, I have begun to doubt its correctness. What Prosser
may have been concerned with in comment k was the possibility that strict liability
would be imposed on drugs (or other unavoidably dangerous) products merely
because of a decision maker's intuitive sense that the product's dangers are too
This defect appears very much like categorical liability or product
great.
See infra notes 73-76 and
condemnation defects, which I address below.
accompanying text.
s5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A cmts. i &j (1965).
s6 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 (Alaska 1979);
1969); Lester v.
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill.
Maic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982).
Informed consent law might require the physician to tell the patient of the
risks involved in taking the drug, thereby ensuring that even consumer expectations
will not be violated. See MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D.D.G.
1991) (citing Grain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (D.C. App. 1982), in which the court
stated that informed consent requires disclosure of the risks and benefits of a
prescribed drug and denied summary judgment to doctor who prescribed drug to
plaintiff). Whenever the drug therapy is significant in treating a serious medical
condition, however, any breach of the informed consent obligation is unlikely to
result in a viable cause of action because the consumer will be unable to demonstrate
that she would have refused the drug and thereby avoided the adverse side effect.
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consumer expectations standard does not require identification of an
alternative design; only when we move to a risk-benefit test do we
need to have an alternative design by which to compare risks and
benefits. 8
But a design defect claim under consumer expectations would
not provide much beyond that which already is provided by the
warnings obligation. If a pharmaceutical manufacturer provides
adequate information about adverse effects, contraindications, and
safe use of the drug, then expectations, informed by this information,
will not be disappointed. 9 Thus, with an exception that need not
detain us,4 ° a consumer expectations-based design defect claim would
38

Of course, that explains the struggle in the Restatement (Third) to identify a

design standard for drugs.
The Restatement (Third) rejects the consumer
expectations test as the basis for design defectiveness and replaces it with a riskbenefit test. The risk-benefit test, with its ancillary necessity for identification of an
alternative design, explains the Restatement (Third)'s conceptualization of other
drugs for the same health condition as being the alternative design that might be
employed in order to conduct a risk-benefit analysis. True risk-benefit analysis
requires identification of an alternative design. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword:
UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 468 (1979) ("The heart of the
problem is this: one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect in a
product design until and unless one has identified some design alternative (
including any design omission) that can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit
analysis."); Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect
Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REv. 609, 623 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Schizophrenia].
The consumer expectations test frequently insulated manufacturers from
liability for dangers that were open and obvious. See Vincer v. Esther Williams AllAluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 1975) (holding that there
could be no liability as a matter of law when the average consumer would be
completely aware of the danger to children posed by an above-ground swimming
pool and its retractable ladder that was left in the down position). The consumer
expectations test also tended to protect manufacturers for risks that were adequately
warned about, because once the dangers were in the open, consumer expectations
would not be violated. The practical effect of such a rule, though many courts
denied it, was to insulate design liability of a manufacturer as long as it provided an
adequate warning. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass.
1978) (declining "to adopt any rule which permits a manufacturer or designer to
discharge its total responsibility to workers by simply warning of the dangers of a
product"); see generally Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1193 (1994).
40 The exception relates to the need for a plaintiff to
prove that the failure to
provide adequate warnings caused the plaintiff's injury. Logically, this requires
proof that the physician who made the decision to prescribe would have responded
differently if adequate warnings had been provided. I suspect that some physicians,
because of antilegal and antilitigation views, would be reluctant to acknowledge that
they would have prescribed differently, even if they had been provided full
information about the risks and benefits of a drug. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 384 (D. Md. 1977), affd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) ("The
evidence here shows that as a result of what [the doctor] knew and the conclusions
he drew from what he knew, it would have made no difference if the warnings were
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not seem to provide anything to consumers that the adequate
warning obligation already provides."
What about a risk-benefit test applied to drugs? Risk-benefit, in
contrast with consumer expectations, imposes design obligations
even when a risk is fully disclosed, but only when an alternative safer
design is available. 2 Here, we should acknowledge an important
aspect of the Restatement (Third)'s treatment of pharmaceuticals: It
makes no provision for proof of a design defect based on the
demonstration of an alternative design of the drug that would be
safer, and, on balance, would provide a preferable drug. Indeed,
section 6 appears not to have conceptualized this as a possibility for a
design defect claim. One good reason for this omission is that, as was
mentioned earlier, most single-agent drugs cannot be designed
differently. But there are a number of exceptions, and each of the
exceptions previously mentioned provides a plausible basis for a
design defect analysis of a drug based on section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third), the general design defect section. Thus, in the
case of the Massengill Company's "Elixir Sulfanilamide," the drug was
defective because of the diethylene glycol solvent that its
manufacturer employed to deliver sulfanilamide, the first of the sulfa
drugs.4 - There was nothing wrong with the sulfanilamide. The risk
was solely a result of the choice of solvent, a characteristic of
sulfanilamide that was in no way immutable.
Surely, there is no
reason a drug that, while still beneficial for some class of patients, but
could be rendered safer for all patients without reducing its
therapeutic benefit, should not be subjected to a risk-benefit analysis
of the form set forth in section 2 (b) of the Restatement (Third).
Similarly, there is no reason marginal improvements cannot be
conceived of for combination drugs.
The examples already
mentioned, Bendectin and fiorinal,45 illustrate the way in which some
combination drugs may be designed alternatively to reduce their risk
in the form which plaintiff contends would be adequate."). But see DeLuryea v.
Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff not required to have
physician testify about the impact of warnings on prescription decision); Wooderson
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan. 1984).
41 But seeAusness, supranote 7, at 736 (concluding that manufacturers
would fare
worse under a consumer expectations standard than they do with comment k). In
reaching his conclusion, Professor Ausness fails to consider the role of warnings in
affecting expectations.
42 See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 468; Green, Schizophrenia,supra
note 38, at 617.
3 See PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 42 (1980).
See id. at 42, 48; see alSOJACKSON, supra note 18, at 153-61.
45

See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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without diminishing their efficacy. Finally, medicinal chemistry, a
branch of pharmacology that relies on rational drug design, has
progressed to the point that some drugs can be engineered by
modifying the molecular structure of a known substance in order to
make it more efficacious or to remove adverse side effects. Tagamet
(cimetidine), a billion-dollar anti-ulcer drug, is an example of a drug
that was developed through manipulation of the molecular structure
of other, similar chemicals. 6 While the number of such successful
efforts in designing new drugs based on what is known about
molecular structure and its effect on biological mechanisms of action
is quite small, it seems safe to predict that these efforts will become
more widespread and successful as technology improves.
Before drug engineering through medicinal chemistry can have
a practical impact on drug design law, the technology will have to
progress so that researchers can, with some confidence, know that
specific modifications of a chemical's molecular structure will have
predictable effects. Until that is the case, even rational drug design,
while reducing the number of new substances required to be tested
from thousands to a few, still requires that those few go through the
full panoply of ne drug testing to confirm that the drug has the
predicted therapeutic benefits and adverse effects. As Professor
Aaron Twerski pointed out to me, we surely do not want to require
courts in drug design cases to determine what would happen in
clinical trials and in the FDA new drug approval process of a
potentially promising new compound identified through medicinal
chemistry techniques.
Nevertheless, what emerges from this analysis is that a critical
criterion for insulating drugs, or any other products for that matter,
from the standard design defect analysis is that the drug itself is not
capable of being changed in any fashion that would make it safer.
When a drug can be made safer, the justifications for different design
treatment no longer exist. But because drugs can, at least in some
circumstances, be designed for increased safety, the Restatement
(Third) seems correct in adopting the position that design defect
liability for pharmaceuticals may sometimes be appropriate, if not in
appropriately defining the scope of liability.
One possible response to this critique is to trot out another
difference between pharmaceuticals and other durable goods - FDA
regulation - and to assert that, with such careful regulatory
46 See WILLIAM

1995).

0. FOYE et al., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 435-38 (4th ed.
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oversight, we need not have tort law (and inexpert juries) secondguessing FDA expert determinations.
While there is considerable
force to this claim that the FDA is better able to determine whether a
drug's benefits outweigh its risks and what those risks are than is the
civil justice system, there are a number of difficulties with this
argument. First, the FDA's regulatory authority for drugs is reactive,
not proactive. The FDA responds to a New Drug Application
submitted by a pharmaceutical manufacturer that has identified and
tested a new drug to determine whether the drug is effective and
safe. 48 The FDA does not regulate the design of a drug and whether it
might be formulated differently to improve the therapeutic benefitto-risk ratio, although a combination drug would not be approved
today unless the manufacturer had conducted studies that
demonstrated that each active component made a positive
contribution to the efficacy-to-risk ratio of the combination drug.
Even if the FDA oversaw the design of drugs, and a great deal that the
FDA does is done informally in negotiations with industry
manufacturers,49 an important qualification on reliance on the FDA
with regard to drug design must be recognized.
The explanation for that qualification begins with the
understanding that the FDA is entirely dependent on testing that is
performed and reported by the sponsoring manufacturer when the
FDA approves a new drug.0 It should be noted, however, that the
FDA regulates the testing process, including the study design, the
method by which the design is carried out, and data integrity. 5' Thus,
47 See Henderson, Jr., supra note 7, at 491; Aaron D.
Twerski, Inside the Restatement,

24 PEPP. L. REV. 839, 854 (1997).
48 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (Supp. III 1994)
(describing the required contents of an
NDA); Id. § 355(d) (describing criteria for FDA approval or rejection of NDA);
Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for PrescriptionDrug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 8-10
(1973) ("Although no provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
provides that the FDA may approve a drug only if the benefits outweigh the risks, this
inevitably is the crux of any decision to permit a new drug to be marketed or to allow
an old one to remain on the market."); Dixie Farley, Benefit Vs. Risk: How FDA
Approves New Drugs, 21 FDA CONSUMER 7, 7 (Dec. 1987-Jan. 1988) (noting that both
safety and efficacy must exist for the FDA to approve a drug, but some risk always is
associated with a drug: "[i]t's when the benefits outweigh the risks that FDA
considers a drug safe enough to approve").
49 See PETER B. HuTr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW: CASES AND
MATERIuALs 1178-1206 (2d ed. 1991).
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (Supp. III 1994); see also Merrill,
supra note 48, at 17
n.59; cf Paul Dueffert, The Role of Regulatmy Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 175, 206 (1989) (stating that "a drug... must undergo extensive testing by the
[FDA] ").
51 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of
Government Regulation of Medical
Products,82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1778-83 (1996).
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accepting, arguendo, that we can rely on the FDA to ensure optimal
design before approving a drug, we must require that a manufacturer
complied with FDA testing and reporting requirements before
deferring to its judgment on design questions." Yet one looks in vain
The Author has previously argued that:
we should recognize that any defense based on FDA regulation would
have to be structured as a compliance with FDA regulatory standards
rather than as a defense based on FDA approval of the drug in
question. The reason is quite simple but based on a fact that is not well
known: the FDA's approval of a drug, which includes a determination
of the appropriate labeling (i.e., warnings) is wholly dependent on
testing performed and reported by the sponsoring manufacturer. The
FDA conducts none of the testing [required to] demonstrate that a,
proposed new drug is safe and effective [as] required by the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for
approval of new drugs by the FDA. The FDA does review the results of
the tests performed by the manufacturer and submitted as part of its
NDA; sometimes the FDA will request additional information or tests.
In the end, it is the FDA that makes the judgment whether a drug is
safe and efficacious.
Any conclusion that the FDA's approval
represents a considered assessment that an approved drug's
therapeutic benefits outweigh its risks, however, is unwarranted without
manufacturer investigation that complies with FDA requirements for
adequate and well-controlled studies of the new drug, accurate
reporting of the results of those tests, and truthful responses to
inquiries by the FDA.
Green, Statutoy Compliance, supra note 25, at 481 (footnotes omitted); see also
Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573, 577 (W.D. La. 1988) (permitting
plaintiff to make a design defect claim upon a showing that "FDA approval was based
on erroneous data.").
While I do not know the incidence of manufacturers failing to provide complete
and accurate information to the FDA during the premarketing testing phase, there
are a number of notable examples in which manufacturers have not conscientiously
fulfilled their obligations. See Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1389 (4th
Cir. 1995) (involving a manufacturer that failed to provide drug experience reports
on a timely basis); Hearings on Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 725 (1975) (statement of a former
FDA Commissioner characterizing the problem of false and misleading reporting to
52

the FDA as "serious and grave"); JOHN ABRAHAM,

SCIENCE, POLITICS AND THE

92-96 (1995) (summarizing the inaccurate and
incomplete data submitted to the FDA in support of the NDA for Naproxen); STEVEN
PHARMACEUTICAL

INDUSTRY

GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL
DEVICES 188 (1993) (noting that "there is substantial evidence of incomplete
compliance with FDA regulations"); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH

DEFECTS:

THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION

83-86, 128-29

(1996) [hereinafter GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS] (describing the events
surrounding the cover-ups of the adverse effects and event reports of MER / 29 and
Bendectin); Merrill, supra note 48, at 5-6 (recounting McNeil Laboratories'
concealment of the adverse effects of Flexin); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive
Damages and Regulated Products, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1335, 1348-52 (1993) (describing
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at section 6 of the Restatement (Third) for any requirement that
products meet regulatory compliance,3 as opposed to merely regulatory
approval, before design claims invoking alternative designs of the
same product are barred. 54
Might another difference between drugs and other goods
support a design standard that imposes no obligation on the
manufacturer to attempt to improve the drug itself? The only
plausible possibility is the existence of a learned intermediary, the
physician. In theory, the physician makes a careful judgment about

several instances in which drug manufacturers concealed from the FDA the adverse
effects of new drugs); Excerpts from Dr. Goddard's Address, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1966, at
24 (expressing dismay on the part of the then-FDA Commissioner regarding poor
quality and dishonesty in the submission of investigational drug studies).
One might respond that, if a manufacturer fails to comply with FDA regulatory
requirements, then it would be liable per se or the product would be deemed
defective. The situation is considerably more complicated than that because of the
need to connect the manufacturer's failure to comply with the plaintiff's harm. See
Green, Statutory Compliance, supra note 25, at 490-96. Section 4(a), which provides
that a product is defective if it fails to comply with an "applicable product safety
statute or administrative regulation," arguably might apply in the situation in which a
drug was approved based on studies that did not comply with FDA requirements or
based on other misconduct by the manufacturer in the premarketing testing that
produced a biased NDA. See RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCTS LIABILITY §
4(a) (1997). The difficulty is that section 4(a) appears to be limited to product
standard statutes and regulations, not ones that govern the process of testing.
54 Several states have adopted statutes specifically addressing FDA drug approval,
although most of the statutes require compliance with FDA regulations as a
prerequisite to a tort defense, not merely FDA approval of the drug. See, e.g., ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-701 (West 1992) (insulating drug manufacturer from liability for
punitive damages if the drug was approved by and labeled in accordance with FDA
requirements; no protection from liability, however, if plaintiff proves that
manufacturer knowingly violated FDA regulations in failing to provide information
or misrepresenting that which it provides); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5)
(West Supp. 1999) (pharmaceutical manufacturer is not liable for drug approved by
FDA subject to exception for fraud on or bribery of FDA); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4
(West 1987) (rebuttable presumption that a warning provided in FDA-approved
labeling is adequate); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (1996) (singling out drugs and
providing that if they are approved by the FDA with labeling that conforms to
government standards, that fact is relevant to whether the manufacturer is liable);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.801 (C) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (barring punitive
damages against manufacturer of drug manufactured and labeled in compliance
FDA requirements, provided that manufacturer did not withhold or misrepresent
material information to FDA); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (1995) (barring punitive
damages in pharmaceutical case in which drug and labeling was approved by FDA,
provided that material information was not withheld or misrepresented to
prescribing physicians or FDA); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (1996) (prohibiting the
award of punitive damages if the drug causing the claimant's harm received
premarketing approval or licensure by the FDA, unless it is shown, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the drug manufacturer knowingly withheld or
misrepresented material and relevant information from FDA).
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the propriety of a given drug for the patient based on the drug's
characteristics and the individual circumstances of the patient.
Professor Henderson avowedly believes so: "Unless one is ready to
admit to the possibility of frequent, massive failures in the 'FDAlearned intermediary' market system, the rule . . .adopted by the

[American Law Institute] represents the' 55 appropriate judicial
response to prescription drug design liability."
Professor Henderson's argument is persuasive in one context.
The presence of the physician may justify declining to permit a
design challenge based on other drugs that are available to treat the
patient's condition (as explained below).5 But surely the physician
has no role in overseeing the pharmaceutical manufacturer, and any
choices that the manufacturer makes about how to coat, combinate,
or formulate its drugs." In those respects, the learned intermediary is
of no more assistance in protecting the patient's interests than is a
metal detector in providing security against a B-52 bombing.
The final difference to consider is the high social value of drugs:
the importance of making them readily available and of encouraging
research into new drugs by the pharmaceutical industry. The
essential concern is overdeterrence, that tort liability may deter
research that would yield socially beneficial drugs or that building the
costs of adverse effects into the price of drugs would put them out of
reach for some consumers.
With regard to overdeterrence, existing evidence is equivocal
and does not get to the heart of the question. There is no method
for systematically identifying or measuring the foregone research and
development efforts of pharmaceutical companies, its consequences
for new drug development, or the drugs that were driven off the
market because of liability concerns. 58 Nor is there any means for
55

56
57

Henderson,Jr., supra note 7, at 486.
See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
In short, the most that the learned intermediary function of the doctor can

justify in terms of designing a liability regime is that, as long as adequate information
is provided by drug manufacturers to physicians, we can rely on that information to
protect against consumer behavior that is suboptimal in selecting drugs. See
Henderson,Jr., supranote 7, at 481 & n.55 (claiming that the market for prescription
drugs works "remarkably well"). The recent development of direct-to-consumer
advertising of prescription drugs and its aggressive adoption by the pharmaceutical
industry raises serious questions about whether physicians even serve this rational
gatekeeping function. Of course, to the extent that pharmaceutical advertising
concerns elective and cosmetic matters (such as advertising of Rogaine), we are
dealing with products that are central to consumer choice and desire and do not
implicate therapeutic decision making.
This discussion is drawn from GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS, supra
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comparing these costs of overdeterrence with the benefits derived
from drugs that properly never made it to market because of their
danger. There are some highly publicized reports of individual
useful drugs that were removed from the market because of liability
concerns, including Bendectin, several vaccines, and, to extend the
list to medical devices, the Copper-7 IUD, and, as the evidence
increasingly suggests, silicone gel breast implants. Counterbalancing
this anecdotal list are a number of instances in which the tort system
was the engine for the removal of dangerous drugs and medical
devices, including diethylstilbestrol (DES). and the Dalkon Shield
IUD. Steven Garber, the author of a careful Rand Institute study,
concludes that liability is unlikely to deter efforts to develop drugs
that offer a major breakthrough over existing therapies. Other
factors, such as company's market niche, strategic goals, and
regulation, probably play a more powerful role in determining the
research and development activities of firms in the industry. The
research activity that liability concerns do affect in high-risk areas
such as birth control and pregnancy is likely shifted to other
therapeutic areas, rather than completely lost. The vast majority of
drugs do not have liability concerns, and even some that do, such as
Accutane and thalidomide (both known teratogens), are currently
being marketed. Especially with regard to design liability based on
redesigning the drug itself, one would expect this quite limited
theory to have modest adverse impact on drug firms' research and
development behavior.
In the alternative design milieu, a risk-benefit analysis should
impose liability only when the overall benefits of the drug can be
improved. To refuse to examine alternative design possibilities is
akin to saying, after a dialysis patient is electrocuted by a dialysis
machine due to a defect in the grounding of the machine: "Because
dialysis machines are so important to the health of those with
damaged kidneys, we will not permit examination of the electrical
design of this machine to determine if it might have been made in a
way to eliminate the risk of electrocution." At the margin, we should
always be willing to examine whether
we can improve the overall
59
benefit-to-risk ratio of a product.
note 52, at 339-41; see also GARBER, supra note 52, at 95-97, 103-04; JUDITH P. SWAzEY,
PrescriptionDrug Safety and Product Liability, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILiTY ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 291 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991).
59 This is a mistake that many make. See generally Green, Schizophrenia,
supra note
38; Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions,and the
Medical MalpracticeExplosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293 (1988) (explaining that advances
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Another way to determine if a drug is defectively designed is to
compare it with another drug available for the same disease or
medical condition. For many diseases, illnesses, or other health
conditions, multiple drugs are on the market and, to determine
defectiveness, we might compare the benefit-to-risk ratio of one drug
with an alternative drug. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the Restatement
(Third) has no provision allowing for a drug's design to be
challenged by comparison to an alternative drug. If another drug has
a better benefit-to-risk ratio, why not permit a jury to compare it with
the first, to determine whether the first is defectively designed?
One poor reason why we should not permit these comparisons is
the FDA's regulatory oversight of pharmaceuticals. When the 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act were being
debated, the pharmaceutical industry successfully removed a
provision that would have permitted the FDA to make interdrug
comparisons when passing on a New Drug Application. 6 If the FDA
cannot decline to approve a drug because better drugs are already
available on the market, it makes some sense for the courts to have a
role in determining whether a new drug is truly designed more safely
than others that are already available, or vice-versa.
Section 6 of the Restatement (Third)'s standard for design
defect requires elaboration as a predicate to explaining why
in technology provide the opportunity for more tort liability because errors in
connection with technology can result in harm that otherwise would have been
attributed to nature). The late Aaron Wildavsky made this mistake in his critique of
tort law, asserting that advances in technology have been responsible for the
enormous improvements in public health and life expectancy, and, therefore, tort
law should be constrained so as not to impede new technology. See AARON
WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 212 (1988); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60
PUB. INTEREST 23, 28-29 (Summer 1980).
60 SeeJohn Ballin, Who Makes TherapeuticDecisions?, 242 JAMA 2875, 2875 (1979).
As a practical matter, the FDA often employs informal mechanisms in its regulatory
oversight of the pharmaceutical industry. With a number of substantial weapons and
considerable discretion, the FDA frequently negotiates with a company to attain a
result that the FDA might not have the legal authority to obtain or which, because of
procedural requirements, would take much time and litigation to accomplish. The
"voluntary" withdrawal of the popular allergy medicine, Seldane, by Hoechst Marion
Roussel appears to have been accomplished through this informal negotiation
method. The FDA wanted Seldane removed from the market because of serious
adverse side effects and the availability of another drug that was equally effective but
avoided the adverse effects. Hoechst resisted these efforts, and the FDA responded
by making a public announcement in September 1997, warning of a "potentially fatal
heart condition" caused by Seldane. See Seldane: FDA Issues a New Heart Warning over
Allergy Remedy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1997, at 7. In December 1997, Hoechst
announced that it was withdrawing Seldane from the market after the FDA approved
an alternative, decongestant version. See PopularSeldane Being Withdrawn Because of
Risks, THE COMM. APPEAL, Dec. 30, 1997, at A4.
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interdrug comparisons for design defect purposes are undesirable.
Ironically, the design defect standard for pharmaceuticals provided
in the Restatement (Third) is one that does not require proof of a
feasible alternative design, but permits a finding of defect based on
categorical liability.
"Categorical liability" means that a
determination of defectiveness is permitted based on the inherent
risks that a product poses without proof of any alternative design.
Such liability might be based on a judgment that a product's risks
outweigh its benefits, and, therefore, the manufacturer should not be
marketing the product because it is too dangerous, or, at a minimum,
all harms caused by the product should be imposed on the
manufacturer.6'
There is a certain irony to the Restatement (Third)'s leniency on
feasible alternative designs for challenged drugs because, during the
drafting of the Restatement (Third), there was a pitched battle over
categorical liability, with the Reporters insisting that it should not be
recognized and with certain other forces (of darkness, or of light,
depending on your perspective) insisting that it should.62 Ultimately,
a compromise was forged, although one far closer to the Reporters'
views than to that of their antagonists. So, while the design defect
standard in section 6 permits categorical liability (condemnation of a
drug as not worthy of being on the market), such liability is very
limited.
Only when no reasonable health-care provider would

That is not quite how the language of section 6 puts it. Rather, section
6
provides for liability for a design defect in a drug if its risks are such that "reasonable
health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits,
would not prescribe the drug ... for any class of patients." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
61

PRODUcrs LIABILrY § 6(c) (1997).
See, e.g., Harvey M. Grossman, CategoricalLiability: Why the Gates Should
Be Kept
Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 386 (1995) (labeling categorical liability "a form of
judicial outlawry, through the tort system, of entire categories of products now in
use"); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 919-20 (1998) (defending the position
adopted by the Restatement); Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in
Product Strict Liability Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1189,
1193-94 (1994) (arguing that requiring plaintiff to show a reasonable alternative
design "simply and neatly eliminates the concept of strict liability from product
desgn law").
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at Reasonable
Alternative Design: The Reporters' Travelogue, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 563, 583-88
(1997) (describing the origin and adoption of the "Habush amendment," which
allows a court to impose liability on the manufacturer of a product without proof of a
reasonable alternative design if the product is so dangerous that it never should have
been produced).
TORTS:

62
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prescribe the drug for any class of patients is the drug defective in
designi 4
Whenever I have taught prescription drug liability and comment
k, I ask my students about thalidomide. In recent years, the only
response I get is a quizzical look. Among my nontraditional students,
however, there is understanding. Thalidomide is the horror drug of
all time, which produced terribly deformed children with flipper
limbs or no limbs, described by the Saturday Review as "cocoons of
flesh." Anyone who saw pictures of these children in the news
magazines of the early 1960s appreciates that graphic description.
Yet thalidomide would not be defective under section 6, and I would
venture the prediction that eight out of ten judges would rule that
way as a matter of law (or exclude an expert who opined otherwise in
applying section 6), because thalidomide is effective in treating a
complication of leprosy and received FDA approval for that use in
July 1998.65

I do not mean to be critical of the Restatement (Third) with this
observation. The Reporters were correct, in my opinion, in not
permitting interdrug benefit-to-risk ratios as a basis for design defect
litigation, for reasons they explain and for an additional reason that
they do not. As the Restatement (Third) observes, different subsets
of patients will have their own individual risk-to-benefit ratio for the
same drug. A drug that may be the drug of choice for children may
not be the drug of choice for those past child-bearing age. The drug
of choice for an otherwise healthy patient with asthma may not be the
6
drug of choice for someone with liver disease or liver sensitivity.
Within the range of diseases and illnesses for which drugs are
prescribed, there are a large number of parameters with regard to

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABiLrY § 6 (1997).
See Sheryl G.Stolberg, ThalidomideApproved to Treat Leprosy, with Other Uses Seen,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at Al (reporting that, in addition to its use in treating
leprosy, thalidomide is being investigated for its efficacy in treating other disorders,
including AIDS and cancer). The approved use of thalidomide is for the prevention
and suppression of erythema nodosum leprosum, the severe skin lesions
characteristic of Hansen's disease (leprosy). See W. Martin Davis & I. Wade Waters,
New DrugApprovals of 1998 - Part 2, DRUG Topics, Mar. 1, 1999, at 68.
6 See NATIONAL ASTHMA EDUCATION AND PREVENTION PROGRAM, EXPERT PANEL
REPORT II: GUIDELINES FOR THE DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT OF ASTHMA 3a-4 (1997)

[hereinafter NATIONAL ASTHMA]; see also Sheryl G. Stolberg, Stricter Rules Are Urged On

Use of a Diabetes Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at A9 (reporting that an FDA panel
recommended that Rezulin, a diabetes drug associated with fatalities and serious
liver damage, remain on the market, but also recommended that Rezulin be
employed only as a last resort when" other therapeutic efforts have- been
unsuccessful).
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the disease, illness, and patient that might bear on the most desirable
drug (among those generally available for the disease or illness for
that patient). This is where the physician, as learned intermediary, is
critical. The knowledgeable physician should take into account the
known, relevant characteristics of the patient and, from among the
available drug therapies, choose the best one for that patient.67 Thus,
having multiple drugs available affords the advantage of some
customizing in the choice of pharmaceutical.8
67

This idealized role of the physician is not borne out in practice. See

MARTIN,

supra note 5, at 2 ("Irrational prescribing has injured many patients and too often
has been lethal. A major pitfall in prescribing is disregard of rational medication of
the patient."); see also SELIG GREENMAN, THE QUALITY OF MERCY 296-97 (1971)
(reporting on the results of a government task force that concluded that most
physicians failed to meet the standard of "rational prescribing" because they lack
training in pharmacology, do not have enough objective guidance in selecting
proper drugs, and are often too busy to take advantage of such guidance even when
it exists); MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICs 282-304,
289 (1974) (examining evidence of widespread misprescribing of drugs and stating,
specifically, that because most antibacterial drugs are prescribed without any
evidence of bacterial infection, such drugs "were used as a pharmaceutical version of
propitiating the gods"); F. M. Scherer, Pricing Profits, and Technological Progress in the
PharmaceuticalIndustry, 7J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 101 (1993) ("[P]hysicians tend to be risk
averse, insensitive to cost, and creatures of habit, prescribing drugs by brand name
even when much less expensive generic substitutes exist."); TEMIN, supra note 43, at
106-19 (asserting that physicians are frequently ignorant of the comparative risks and
benefits of alternative treatments); see generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS, THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS (1968).
A cautionary note about this broad "marketplace of drugs" concept is
appropriate. Most hospitals, managed-care organizations, and other health-care
institutions have established pharmaceutical formularies, in which certain drugs are
selected for availability based on the efficacy, safety, cost, the patient population, and
other relevant considerations. In fact,
[d]rug formularies, particularly in view of the growing importance of
hospital-based medical practice, have considerable potential for the
promotion of rational prescribing. 'The formulary system is a method
used by the medical staff of a hospital, working through a Pharmacy
and Therapeutics Committee, to evaluate and to select, from among
numerous medicinal agents available, those that are considered most
useful therapeutically and to list dosage forms in which they may be
administered most effectively."
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN
William McFate Smith, in CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY:
THERAPEUTICS 17 (Kenneth L. Melmon & Howard F. Morrelli eds., 2d ed. 1978)
(citation omitted); see also American Society of Hospital Pharmacists, ASHP Statement
on the Formulary System, 40 AM.J. HOsP. PHARM. 1384, 1384-85 (1983); Steven B. Cano
& Norman K. Fujita, Formulary Evaluation of Third-Generation Cephalosporins Using
Decision Analysis, 45 Am.J. HOSP. PHARM. 566, 566-69 (1988). The prevalence of these
formularies suggests that having every possible drug available may not be optimal.
With the extent and influence of drug industry marketing, that is probably true as
well in the world-at-large. The question is whether we could devise a system to
establish a national formulary that would weed out the least beneficial and most
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Another reason why the comparison of existing drugs for design
defect purposes is undesirable is that benefit-to-risk ratios are
determined in clinical trials in which researchers examine the effect
of a drug on a group of patients. Inevitably, individual variations are
not explainable based on identifiable variables, like age or liver
health in the examples above. But when a patient has a chronic
problem,6 9 physicians can explore those unknown individual
variations by initially employing the drug of general choice. The
physician can assess how the patient responds, both in terms of
therapeutic effect and in tolerating side effects. If the drug is, for
some reason, unsuccessful or unacceptable, the physician can then
try another drug to see whether that alternative works better for that
individual patient.
Thus, having multiple drugs for the same
condition, even with different overall benefit-to-risk ratios, still is
beneficial because of our lack of knowledge about the mechanisms by
which these chemicals operate.7 Thus, the Restatement (Third)'s
refusal to permit interdrug comparisons to serve as the basis for
finding a defective drug design is well-grounded in two of the
differences between drugs and durable goods. First, permitting
individualized determination of the best version of a drug for an
individual does not pose risks to third-parties, as durables often do.
Second, because of our lack of understanding of the physiological
mechanism of pharmacologic agents, only trial and error can

dangerous drugs.
Acute illnesses treated with a single drug administration and vaccines do not
allow for experimentation with iterative therapies.
This prevents health-care
practitioners from employing and gauging the effectiveness of alternate therapies to
determine which one best suits an individual patient.
70 See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 108-09 ("Alternative medications
(succedanea)
that may be substituted for another with equivalent properties are essential in the
practice of medicine because no two patients may react in exactly the same manner
to a given drug product.").
7
Thus, there are over 50 different drugs from six different drug categories
available for treating hypertension. Different patient characteristics have a bearing
on which drugs are most desirable, including, for example, longer-acting drugs that
require only a single daily dose for patients who would have difficulty complying with
a more frequent regimen. Other drugs are contraindicated for patients with heart

problems. Yet other drugs produce depression in some patients, but there is no way
to predict which patients will suffer this adverse effect; only trial and error can
identify which adverse side effects, along with their severity, will occur. See Joint
National Commission on Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High

Blood Pressure and the National High Blood Pressure Education Program
Coordinating Committee, Special Report, 157 ARCH. INTER. MED. 2413, 2424-27 (1997);
see also NATIONAL AsTHMA, supra note 66, at 3a-1 to 18 (similarly listing numerous

drugs in several biochemical categories for treatment of asthma with various
advantages and disadvantages).
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determine the characteristics that bear on the optimal drug for an
individual.
The final possibility for determining design defect might be to
compare a drug's overall benefits and risks and to declare a drug
defective when its risks outweigh its overall therapeutic benefits. A
variant on this might be a looser notion that when a drug causes
serious injury, a gestalt judgment of defectiveness might be
appropriate. A number of courts that have confronted the question
of determining pharmaceutical design defect seem to have adopted
one or the other of these conceptions.7
Consistent with its treatment of categorical liability for other
products, the Restatement (Third) does not permit a risk-benefit
assessment of a drug for design defect purposes, as long as the drug is
useful for at least one patient population. Whatever one thinks of the
Restatement (Third)'s general rule on categorical liability, one good
reason for treating drugs in this fashion is the regulation provided by
the FDA. The FDA performs a risk-benefit analysis when it approves a
new drug and, as long as the FDA is provided accurate and complete
study data from the drug's sponsor, only a regulatory skeptic or ajury
exalter would suggest that such a determination be reconsidered de
novo in a civil case.73 Moreover, unlike the other conceptions of a
design defect previously considered, overdeterrence is a more serious
concern here because potentially any drug could be the subject of
this open-ended design defect claim. With the vagaries of comparing
statistical therapeutic benefits with the adverse effects suffered by the

See Cupp, Jr., supra note 8, at 89.
I do not mean to claim that the FDA's NDA decisions are perfect. Quite often,
newly marketed drugs reveal previously unappreciated adverse side effects that
require either changes in labeling or removal of the drug from the market. See
73

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW:

POSTAPPROVAL

RisKs

1976-85

(1990) (finding that of 198 prescription drugs approved by the FDA during the
decade from 1976 through 1985, slightly over one-half had serious postapproval risks
that went undetected in the investigational new drug phase). Most of these problems
are inherent in limitations on the clinical testing process and are not due to FDA
error. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Green, Statutory Compliance,
supra note 25, at 496-98 & nn.123-31. Critics, however, cite a considerable number of
approvals for which one might fault the FDA's judgment. See supra note 52.
Nevertheless, the critical question is whether a jury is going to make fewer errors
than is the FDA. More precisely, the inquiry is whether we are better off permitting
juries to find contrary to the FDA's judgment on the overall balances of risks and
benefits of a drug when a plaintiff who was injured by the drug seeks such review. In
analyzing this issue, one should appreciate the political and social influences that
cause the FDA to prefer errors of omission (incorrectly refusing (or postponing)
approval of a drug) to errors of commission (incorrectly approving a drug). See
Green, Statutory Compliance, supra note 25, at 478-80.
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flesh-and-blood plaintiff before the jury,7 1 one might legitimately be
concerned
about the judgments and consequences that would
75
result.
I conclude with where I began. Drugs are different because they
cannot be manipulated physically to provide marginally greater
safety. That was the central insight of the Restatement (Second)'s
treatment of "unavoidably unsafe" products.
The Restatement
(Third)'s failure to appreciate that not all drugs under all
circumstances are "unavoidably unsafe" causes concern. 76 To the
extent that drugs can be manipulated to make them safer, the case
for an exemption from tort liability is hard to justify, even with FDA
regulatory oversight. The Restatement (Third)'s treatment of drug
design ignores combination drugs, dosage, and the future of
employing bioengineering to design drugs to improve their benefitto-risk ratio.77 The Restatement (Third)'s deference to the FDA
should be conditioned on the manufacturers compliance with all
FDA requirements.
Whether these modest criticisms of the
Restatement (Third)'s treatment of drug design are correct or not,
these criticisms reflect a small niche of pharmaceutical products
liability that is not the critical core of how the law allocates losses due
to adverse drug effects. Far more critical is the informational
dimension, a matter carefully regulated by the FDA and backstopped
by the warnings obligation in tort law.

See Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERs L. REv. 1013,
1020-32 (1991). See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judong in Hindsight,65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998)..
See Ausness, supra note 7, at 753-54.
76 Professor Ausness similarly focuses on ."an unavoidable product
risk" as
justifying special treatment for pharmaceuticals. See id. at 761-64.
See id. at 765 ("As mentioned earlier, comment k supposedly
is limited to
unavoidable danger, but as a practical matter, the courts have extended its provisions
to product risks that are not truly unavoidable.").
74

